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Introduction
Despite huge strides in economic development made in many parts of  the world 
over the last few decades, many people in Africa still remain in dire poverty. Ac-
cording to the 200/2008 United Nations Human Development Report, the 
twenty countries with the lowest human development are all located in Sub-Saha-
ran Africa. Trade has often been identified as a vital engine of  economic growth 
and development to facilitate an African renaissance in the 21st Century. However, 
economic integration schemes in Africa continue to suffer from many limita-
tions and Africa’s participation in the global economy remains miniscule. Regional 
integration arrangements in Africa, for example, continue to be characterized by 
overlapping membership and weak institutions. At the turn of  the new century 
Africa’s share of  world trade plummeted to levels below those in the 190s when 
it had accounted for 2 percent of  world trade. The erosion of  Africa’s world trade 
share represents a staggering income loss of  billions of  dollars annually. The ac-
celeration of  globalization seems to have placed Africa at the threshold of  further 
marginalization.
With the formation of  the African Union in 2002 and associated institutions such 
as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), it appeared that 
there was a renewed impetus for development on the continent. A new and better 
calibre of  African leaders emerged in some countries in the 21st century, although 
with some notable exceptions. This paper will explore what needs to be achieved 
for economic integration to be more effective in Africa and for Africa to partici-
pate more effectively in global trade. The relationship between different economic 
integration initiatives in Africa to global trade liberalization in the framework of  
the WTO will be explored. It will be argued that in order for African states to 
become more fully integrated in the global economy they will need to adopt a 
more pro-active rather than reactive approach. Such an approach will center on 
building more effective institutions at the national and regional levels so as to 
give Africa a greater voice in the 21st century. Africa’s development challenges are 
essentially about a crisis of  institutions at the political, economic and social levels. 
Weak regional institutions reflect internal weaknesses of  member states. The paper 
will explore competing conceptual constructs of  regional integration in Africa 
with a view to arriving at a set of  strategic options for enhanced effectiveness. For 
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example, open regionalism based on neo-classical assumptions will be contrasted 
with the concept of  “regionalism from below” which emphasizes the importance 
of  civil society and informal organizations in regionalism. Concerns of  African 
states arising from the existing multilateral framework and current trade round of  
the WTO will also be examined as will be strategic options for integrating Africa 
more fully into the global economy.
Africa’s Position in World Trade
Africa’s relative performance in world trade has been generally declining over the 
past thirty years. Although the levels of  merchandise trade have increased for all 
African countries, Sub-Saharan Africa’s share of  world trade has been in decline 
for several decades, most markedly since the 1980s.1 Table 1 shows, for example, 
that Africa’s share of  world exports was lower in 200 when it stood at 3.1% as 
compared to 193 when its share of  world trade was 5.7%. The extent of  this 
poor performance becomes clear when we compare Africa’s performance with 
that of  the Asian region whose share of  world trade has doubled over the same 
period reaching 27.8 percent in 200. This implies that Africa’s trade performance 
in global terms is far below that of  other developing regions. These declining 
trends indicate Africa’s increased marginalization in world trade.
Figure 1: Africa’s Share of World Trade
Source: European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE), Media Briefing Note, no. 1/2007.
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The figure reveals that even during the period 2003 and 2006 where there has been 
a slight upswing in Africa’s world share, this mostly reflected rising oil prices. Thus 
the upswing is only confined to a handful of  countries, such as Angola and Nige-
ria. While this constitutes a positive development for oil producers, most African 
countries have continued to experience deterioration of  their role in world trade.
Sachs and Warner2 assert that Africa has been left out of  the process of  globaliza-
tion. The World Bank estimates that losses in world trade have cost Africa almost 
$ 0 billion a year due to a lack of  product diversification and falling market 
shares for traditional commodities.3 African states are still heavily dependent on 
traditional export commodities despite their low income elasticity of  demand and 
their declining terms of  trade in the long run. Continuing concentration on these 
traditional exports will have adverse consequences on income and employment.4
Rationale and Fundamental Challenges of Economic Integration Initiatives in Africa
Economic integration refers to the merging of  the economies and economic 
policies of  two or more countries in a given region to various degrees.5 Eco-
nomic integration occurs whenever a group of  countries in the same region join 
together to form a regional trading bloc. Development economists have argued 
that developing states should orient their trade towards each other. They base 
their arguments on the notion that greater collective self-reliance will be fostered 
and that there are comparative advantage changes to South-South as opposed to 
North-South trade. The fundamental economic rationale for economic integra-
tion of  African economies is a long-term dynamic where integration provides the 
opportunity for industries that have not been established yet as well as those that 
have in order to take advantage of  the economies of  large scale production facili-
tated by expanded markets. In the absence of  integration, each separate state may 
not have a sufficiently large domestic market to enable local industries to lower 
their production costs through economies of  scale.7 Economic integration also 
provides the possibility of  an increase in trade patterns where free trade within 
regional trading blocs leads to a shift in production from high to low-cost member 
states. Given the tiny and fragmented economies in Africa, the issue is not whether 
Africa should be integrated but rather how.
2 Jeffrey D. Sachs and Andrew M. Warner, Sources of  Slow Growth in African Economies, in: Journal of  African Econo-
mies, no. 3/99, pp. 33–36.
3 World Bank, Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?, Washington, DC, 2000.
4 Ibid.
5 Michael P. Todaro and Stephen C. Smith, Economic Development, London 200. 
6 W. Arthur Lewis, The Slowing Down of  the Engine of  Growth, in: American Economic Review, no. 4/980, 
pp. 555–54.
7 Todaro and Smith, op. cit. (note 5).
 
Alumni Conference 2008 74
Panel IV: Economic 
Integration and Global 
Trade
Despite these potential advantages there are fundamental challenges for economic 
integration initiatives in Africa. Africa has a multitude of  sub-regional schemes 
and strong political rhetoric supporting them, but the results remain modest. The 
Abuja Treaty of  99 envisaged an African economic community, but progress has 
been mostly sub-regional. The main economic integration schemes in Africa are 
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Southern 
Africa Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of  West Af-
rican States (ECOWAS) and the East African Community (EAC).8 However, intra-
regional trade among African countries remains low accounting for less than 10% 
of  the total trade of  African States. Many African states produce similar primary 
products thereby limiting the potential for trade.
Asymmetries in development among member states within a regional trading bloc 
have constituted a major obstacle to economic integration in Africa. A fear per-
sists that the more developed and relatively larger members of  the trading bloc 
will get disproportionate benefits. Once the poorer member states open up their 
economies to the more developed member states the result could be flooding of  
the domestic market with cheaper goods and the closure of  domestic industries 
in the poorer states.9 This factor contributed to the collapse of  the East African 
Community in 1997 since Kenya, which had a relatively more developed manufac-
turing base compared to Uganda and Tanzania, was considered to be gaining more 
from the economic integration.
Many African states belong to several regional integration initiatives at the same 
time leading to overlapping and conflicting obligations. Kenya, for example, be-
longs to both the East African Community and the Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa. Tanzania belonged both to SADC and COMESA and even-
tually had to pull out of  COMESA because of  conflicting objectives of  the two 
regional trading blocs.
The design and objectives of  regional integration schemes in Africa have also been 
driven by a preference for formal trade and factor market integration rather than a 
focus on basic policy coordination and collaboration in regional projects. This fac-
tor has resulted in excessively ambitious models of  regional integration. However, 
Africa’s unfavorable structural features such as competitive primary production, 
small size, low levels of  per capita incomes, limited manufacturing capacity, weak 
8 World Bank, Can Africa Claim the 21st Century?, op. cit. (note 3).
9 George Saitoti, The Challenges of  Economic and Institutional Reforms in Africa, Aldershot 2002, pp. 101–103.
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financial sectors, poor transportation and communications infrastructure make 
such ambitious models difficult to implement.10
African integration schemes have also suffered from implementation lapses, in-
cluding those due to weak governance. Many states cannot cope with the loss of  
national sovereignty that integration schemes would entail. Other factors that have 
limited economic integration in the African context include a lack of  adequate 
technical and management expertise, and also concerns about losing trade tax 
revenues.
A number of  African states have also experienced protracted conflicts. These 
include, for example, the Democratic Republic of  Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
Somalia and Sudan. Such conflicts hinder effective regional integration because 
the emphasis of  states becomes to address domestic instabilities and they cannot 
therefore effectively focus on fostering regional integration.
Linking Economic Integration and Africa’s Position in World Trade
An important debate with respect to regional integration is whether regional 
groupings will fragment the world economy and run counter to the recent global-
ization of  trade. It can be argued that liberalizing trade at the sub-regional level 
10 Ibid.
Anselme Harelimana from Rwanda (Summer School 2008)
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excludes non-member countries from preferential trade thereby offsetting global-
ization at a broader multilateral level. However, for countries in Africa, effective 
regional trading blocs can provide a buffer against the negative effects of  global-
ization while still permitting the dynamic benefits of  intra-union specialization 
and greater equality among members to take place.11 Globalization refers to the 
integration of  markets, nation-states, and technologies to a degree not witnessed 
before and permitting individuals, corporations and nation-states to reach around 
the world further, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before.12 A challenge for 
African states is to gain from the trend towards globalization. Stronger regional 
integration blocs will improve Africa’s position in world trade, especially if  such 
economic integration encourages greater competitiveness of  Africa’s products. 
Regional integration can also encourage investment in the export sector in African 
states as entire regions can be promoted as one investment area. More effective 
economic integration blocs in Africa will also give African states a greater voice in 
multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization.
Concerns for African States in the current Doha Trade Round
The current round of  WTO multilateral trade negotiations was launched in No-
vember 2001 in Doha, Qatar. It is intended to enhance the development relevance 
of  the WTO, although expectations for its successful conclusion remain mixed. 
The collapse of  the Doha Ministerial in Cancún, Mexico, in September 2003 un-
derscored the challenges faced by the negotiators.13 African states have several key 
concerns relating to the Doha round.
Agriculture remains a fundamental concern for African states because many of  
their economies are still predominantly agricultural. The WTO Agreement on 
Agriculture is seen as one of  the most controversial because special and differen-
tial treatment is, in effect, provided to developed rather than developing countries. 
African, and other developing countries, accepted the Uruguay Round Agreements 
as a whole mainly because they thought they would benefit from agricultural 
liberalization and subsidy reduction in the OECD countries under the Agreement 
on Agriculture. However, these promises were often not fulfilled and loopholes 
such as the “Green Box” permitted supposedly non-trade distorting subsidies 
by the developed countries. As a result, OECD countries’ agricultural subsidies 
have been legitimized and have increased rather than decreased since the Uruguay 
11 Todaro and Smith, op. cit. (note 5).
12 Thomas L. Friedman, Understanding Globalisation: The Lexus and the Olive Tree, New York, NY, 2000, pp. 3–1.
13 Carlos A. Primo Braga and Elwyn Grainger-Jones, The Multilateral Trading System: Mid-Flight Turbulence or Systems 
Failure?, in: Richard S. Newfarmer (ed.), Trade, Doha, and Development: A Window into the Issues (The World Bank), 
Washington, DC, 200, pp. 27–42.
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Round.14 Many farmers in Africa have therefore been pushed out of  farming or 
lost their land because they cannot compete.
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is also of  concern to Afri-
can states. Trade in services was brought into GATT for the first time under the 
Uruguay Round despite misgivings among developing states. As a compromise 
it was agreed that a “bottom-up” approach would be used so that each member 
would have the right to decide on the sectors it would open up and the limitations 
to liberalizing each sector. However, the GATS agreement is one from which the 
African states reap little benefit because of  the unequal competitive positions of  
service suppliers from the North and South. African countries have therefore been 
put under considerable pressure to liberalize in service sectors where they cannot 
compete thus adversely affecting local service industries and development objec-
tives.15 International trade in services is dominated by a few large multinational 
corporations and given their massive financial strength, world-wide networks and 
access to sophisticated information technology infrastructure, it is difficult for 
indigenous African country providers, which are mainly small and medium enter-
prises, to catch up. Liberalization in services has therefore aggravated the divide in 
supply capacity between developed and developing states.
Yet another area of  concern for African states in the Doha Round is the Trade-
Related Aspects of  Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement. Intellectual 
property rights were brought for the first time into a multilateral trade framework 
during the Uruguay Round. This was done especially at the behest of  multina-
tional corporations in the pharmaceutical and information technology industries, 
especially in the United States, which claimed they were undergoing significant 
losses from the inadequate protection of  their intellectual property abroad. Afri-
can states, like other developing countries, resisted the TRIPs agreement on the 
basis that it would benefit multinational corporations while preventing their own 
enterprises from copying technologies to develop as had been done historically 
in the developed countries. The TRIPs agreement, however, came into effect in 
1995 and it sets high standards of  protection for patents, copyrights, trademarks, 
and industrial design and licenses, allowing patents to be granted on products and 
processes for twenty years.1 The issue of  patenting of  life forms under the TRIPs 
agreement also received widespread criticism from African states. In addition to 
raising fundamental ethnical issues such as the patenting of  the human genome, 
the agreement has in a sense facilitated “biopiracy” through the patenting of  life 
14 Fatoumata Jawara and Aileen Kwa, Behind the Scenes at the WTO: The Real World of  International Trade Negotiations 
The Lessons of  Cancun, London 2004, pp. 25–49.
15 Ibid.
1 Jawara and Kwa, ibid. 
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forms, including plants and their medicinal functions, which were previously avail-
able for public use in African countries.17
Strategies for Overcoming the Challenges of Poor Trade Performance in Africa in the 
21st century
African states therefore face a myriad of  challenges in trade both at the level of  
regional integration and at the WTO multilateral level. African countries have 
considerable potential, but realizing this potential requires action on several fronts 
especially to raise international competitiveness. Sustaining competitive and stable 
real exchange rates are vital to improving export performance in Africa. Real 
exchange rates are critical for export growth. Chile’s experience suggests that 
economic competitiveness need not come at the cost of  adequate integration 
with the global capital market.18 Initially interest and exchange rates in Chile were 
unfavorable to export growth, but gradually these factors changed leading to an in-
crease in the profitability of  exports relative to producing non-tradable commodi-
ties. The Chilean experience provides valuable lessons for African states seeking 
to improve their competitiveness. Chile’s exports have been one of  the engines 
behind its development. The export sector in Chile represents about 40 percent of  
the country’s Gross Domestic Product. Chile’s export market diversification pro-
vides an important lesson for the export policy of  African countries which tend 
to concentrate on a narrow range of  markets and products.19 Kenya’s exports, for 
example, tend to be concentrated on the East African region and the European 
Union. Effective market diversification can, however, only be achieved by a well-
developed and implemented export policy. Chile provides a compelling case for a 
limited but important role of  the state in export promotion. Chile’s endowments, 
like many African countries, have included a rich natural resource base. Its export 
promotion policies show that foreign direct investment is responsive to activities 
that open up new export possibilities or introduce new technologies. In addition, a 
growth strategy spearheaded by a few niche products can lead to important divi-
dends. Chile’s experience also shows that temporary well-managed subsidies can 
spur the growth of  non-traditional exports.20
The East Asian experience also reinforces the argument that the state can play an 
important role in promoting exports by establishing a pro-export incentive struc-
17 Ibid.
18 World Bank, op. cit. (note 3), pp. 219–233.
19 Robert Mudida, The Chilean Experience: Lessons for Kenyan Economic Policy, in: KASNEB Newsline, no. 3, July-Sep-
tember 2002, pp. 3–7.
20 Manuel Agosin, Export Performance in Chile: Lessons for Africa, in: Gerald K Helleiner (ed.), Non-Traditional Exports 
and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Issues and Experiences (forthcoming).
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ture that coexisted with moderate but highly variable protection of  the domestic 
market.21 A variety of  instruments were used in East Asian countries including 
export credit, duty-free imports for exporters and their suppliers, export targets, 
and tax incentives. These measures can be studied by African governments and 
adopted where appropriate.
African tariffs and other trade restrictions are still higher than in other develop-
ing regions and anti-export bias is still considerable. This has significant impact 
especially because of  the small size of  African economies and the importance of  
imported inputs. Many African states are still heavily dependent on trade taxes for 
about one-third of  government revenue.22
It is vital to introduce complementary measures beyond trade policy to improve 
Africa’s competitiveness. Trade reforms need to be accompanied by measures that 
lay a firm foundation for investment and production. These include an effective 
and non-corrupt tax administration, functioning commercial courts, reliable infra-
structure, and a working financial system.
21 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, Oxford 1993, pp. 12–13.
22 World Bank, op. cit. (note 3).
Dominik Antonowicz, Gerald Neugschwandtner, and Alejandro Ribó Labastida (all Summer School 
2002)
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Given shortfalls in domestic investment because of  low incomes, it is vital for Afri-
can states to attract substantial investment to the export sector. A major challenge 
in this respect is that many African countries are still ranked among the riskiest 
places to do business and even retaining domestic savings is difficult. A critical pri-
ority is for African governments to provide a safe and profitable business environ-
ment. Institutional reform is key to improve the business environment. Institutions 
in this context refer to sets of  formal or informal rules governing the actions of  
individuals and organizations and the interactions of  participants in the develop-
ment process.23 Formal legal rules may, for example, ensure that contracts are en-
forced, property rights honored and competition maintained. Informal rules relate 
to unwritten rules which are deeply embedded in a society’s culture and reflect its 
fundamental values. Institutions simultaneously enable and constrain the actions of  
individuals or organizations. Institutional reforms specify new rules or change old 
ones with the intention of  changing the behavior of  individuals and organizations. 
African states should aim to create institutions which aim to promote entrepre-
neurship, profits and capital accumulation while achieving an overall objective of  
promoting the common good.24 It is necessary to undertake measures to strength-
en the state and manage public resources in more accountable ways. Domestic and 
international pressure must be sustained so as to ensure greater entrenchment of  
democratic values in many African states. Such values combined with a greater 
concern for the common good will help to stem the massive levels of  corruption 
that have impeded development in many parts of  Africa. Institutional reform will 
also help to reduce protracted conflicts in many parts of  Africa because it will 
ensure that basic needs of  the larger proportion of  the population are more ad-
equately met. There are close linkages between security and development.25
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) also constitute an important vehicle 
for improving Africa’s trade prospects in the 21st century. They are based on the 
principle of  “more trade not aid.” An example is the attempt to create a free trade 
area between the European Commission of  the European Union and the Group 
of  African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP). The EPAs are a fundamental 
element of  the Cotonou Agreement, which is the latest agreement in the his-
tory of  ACP-EU Development Co-operation. The Cotonou Agreement aims at 
poverty reduction while contributing to the sustainable development and gradual 
integration of  the ACP countries into the world economy.
23 World Bank, Entering the 2st Century: World Development Report 999/2000, Washington, DC, 2000, pp. 3–30.
24 Delphin Rwegasira, From Recovery to Accelerated Development: Some Key Issues for Twenty-First Century Africa, in: 
Ernest Aryeetey et al. (eds.), Asia and Africa in the Global Economy, Tokyo 2003, pp. 385–399.
25 Mudida, The Security-Development Nexus: A Structural Violence and Human Needs Approach, in: Katrin Brockmann, 
Hans Bastian Hauck and Stuart Reigeluth (eds.), From Conflict to Regional Stability: Linking Security and Development 
(Research Institute of  the DGAP), Berlin 2008, pp. 11–22.
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Despite past challenges, the case for stronger economic integration in Africa 
remains compelling. There is a widely held view within Africa that African unity 
could help stem its political and economic marginalization. The promise of  pan-
Africanism has kept alive the ideals of  the Lagos Plan of  Action despite formi-
dable challenges in its implementation. Thus a vital policy question for African 
states in the 21st century is how regionalism can help to attain Africa’s develop-
ment goals in a globalized economy. Given Africa’s modest success with regional 
integration, it is vital that a regionalism with a more flexible design is stressed, 
based on cooperation among countries to jointly implement specific projects. Such 
cooperation should include transportation and communications infrastructure in 
addition to investment regulation and trade policies.
Since many African economies are small, both individually and in sub-groups, the 
potential welfare gains from freer trade in Africa may be limited in the short to 
medium term. This implies that perhaps the principal focus of  integration should 
be on promoting investment rather than intra-regional free trade. The creation of  
an economic space where investors can produce for regional as well as global mar-
kets may provide small African economies with better growth opportunities than 
simply removing trade barriers among themselves.
The concerns that African countries have relating to the current Doha Round 
underscore the need to pay more attention to multilateral negotiations and try 
to influence the outcome. Many African states do not even have representatives 
in the WTO. African states should participate in setting the global agenda and 
partner with other developing countries, for example, in Latin America and Asia 
to negotiate for the dismantling of  restrictive trade practices that inhibit export 
diversification in poor countries. To improve the multilateral trade regime, insti-
tutional reforms within the WTO are required. These reforms should focus on 
how decisions are made, what gets put on the agenda, how disagreements are 
resolved and how rules are enforced.2 Such reforms, if  effective, will ensure that 
the benefits of  globalization are more equitably shared. The agricultural sector, 
for example, accounts for almost two-thirds of  the economic gains that could be 
obtained by dismantling the present global system of  merchandise trade barriers 
and farm subsidies.27
2 Joseph Stiglitz, Making Globalisation Work, London 200, pp. 1–101.
27 Kym Anderson and Will Martin, Agriculture: The Key to Success of  the Doha Round, in: Richard S. Newfarmer (ed.), 
op. cit. (note 13), pp. 77–9.
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Conclusion: Towards a New Trade paradigm?
The current trade challenges faced by African states expose the shortcomings of  
the neo-liberal model of  economic development which has dominated the WTO. 
An important aspect of  the new agenda is to recognize that trade is an instrument 
and not the ultimate goal of  policy. The fundamental policy goal is economic 
development in the context of  a fair, inclusive and politically acceptable globaliza-
tion.28 Thus for African states, trade represents much more than simply commer-
cial interactions—it is a vital avenue for their development. “Open regionalism” is 
informed by neo-classical assumptions that the market is the key driving force of  
integration.29 This approach is consistent with unfettered economic globalization 
and has a tendency of  reinforcing in some respects the inequalities in the inter-
national system. In view of  their development objectives, African states should 
pursue an approach to economic integration and multilateralism that mitigates 
the adverse effects of  globalization on their economies. Such an approach should 
emphasize collective self-reliance through the mobilization of  regional resources 
and also promote “regionalism from below.” This entails underscoring the im-
portance of  civil society and the informal sector in the economic integration 
framework.30 Such home-grown approaches serve to improve Africa’s situation in 
economic integration and its position in global trade. Enabling macro-economic 
policies should also be pursued at the domestic level underpinned by measures 
for improved accountability and infrastructure. Institutional reform is vital at the 
political, economic and social levels. Such reform should aim at infusing a culture 
of  greater concern for the common good. Only then can Africa truly claim the 
21st century.
28 Thomas I. Palley, Globalisation and the Changing Trade Debate: Suggestions for a New Agenda, in: Public Policy Brief  
(The Levy Economics Institute of  Bard College), no. 9/200, pp. –6.
29 John K. Akokpari, Dilemmas of  Regional Integration and Development, in: Akokpari et. al. (eds.), African Union and 
Its Institutions (Centre for Conflict Resolution), Cape Town 2008, pp. 8–0.
30 Ibid.
